1	STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
2	COUNTY OF RAMSEY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
3	File No. 62-C9-06-003962
4	John Doe 76C,
5	Plaintiff,
6	vs. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
7	Archdiocese of St. Paul-Minneapolis, 10/3/13 HEARING Diocese of Winona,
8	Defendants.
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11	The above-entitled matter came duly on for hearing
12	before the Honorable John B. Van de North, Judge of
13	District Court, on the 3rd day of October, 2013, City of
14	St. Paul, State of Minnesota.
15	APPEARANCES:
16	Jeff Anderson, Esq., Elin Lindstrom, Esq., Michael
17	Finnegan, Jr., Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.
18	Thomas Wieser, Esq., Jennifer Larimore, Esq.,
19	appeared on behalf of Defendant Archdiocese of St. Paul -
20	Minneapolis.
21	Thomas Braun, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendant
22	Diocese of Winona.
23	Paul Engh, Esq., appeared on behalf of an unnamed
24	priest.
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THE COURT: Please be seated. Welcome to Ramsey County District Court. Good morning again. For those of you who don't know me, I'm Jack Van de North. I'm one of the judges here in Ramsey County and I've been assigned to handle a number of the clergy abuse cases.

We have one of those before us this morning involving a plaintiff identified as John Doe 76C, I believe. There's a little different twist on this particular case. The individual at the center of this storm this morning is not John Doe 76C, but a gentleman named David Pususta -- am I saying your name right?

MR. PUSUSTA: You did, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On the first try too. I should get an A for that. David Pususta who has brought a motion to intervene in the John Doe 76 case. There are so many preliminary issues I know the attorneys want to talk to regarding confidentiality as to some of the clergy identified in Mr. Pususta's pleadings today. And so we'll talk about that in generic terms as an initial matter.

There's also a personal jurisdiction issue that has been focused on particularly by the Winona diocese who is represented here. So those are some

preliminary comments. 1 Let's get some appearances here. Here for 2 Mr. Pususta today we have? 3 MR. ANDERSON: Jeff Anderson, Your Honor. 4 Good morning. And you've already met Mr. Pususta, 5 David Pususta. And to his right is Elin Lindstrom, 6 7 E-1-i-n, -s-t-r-o-m. THE COURT: Ms. Lindstrom, are you with Mr. 8 Anderson's office? 9 MS. LINDSTROM: Yes, Your Honor. 10 Nice to meet you. You're not THE COURT: 11 related to some of the other Lindstroms around the 12 state, including a former judge from Willmar, are 13 14 you? I'm not. 15 MS. LINDSTROM: THE COURT: Too bad, but nice to meet you 16 I'm sure you're a wonderful Lindstrom in 17 anvwav. your own right. 18 On the other side of the table 19 representing, first of all, the Archdiocese of 20 Minneapolis and St. Paul? 21 MR. WIESER: Tom Wieser. Also Jennifer 22 Larimore, L-a-r-i-m-o-r-e, on behalf of the 23 Archdiocese. 24 THE COURT: Nice to see both of you again. 25

Here for Winona? 1 Thomas Braun on behalf of the MR. BRAUN: 2 Diocese of Winona. 3 THE COURT: A face I'm familiar with at the 4 end of the table? 5 Paul Engh on behalf of an MR. ENGH: 6 unnamed priest who has a stake in whether or not his 7 name is disclosed. 8 THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Engh, nice to 9 see you again. 10 I'm observing: Mike MR. FINNEGAN: 11 I'm with Jeff's office as well 12 Finnegan. representing the Plaintiff. 13 THE COURT: Nice to meet you, Mr. Finnegan. 14 Speaking of familial relations, of course I know your 15 father pretty well. Nice to see you. I should say I 16 know Mike Finnegan, Sr., because he was a long-time 17 public defender. And I have to say he did a terrific 18 job for children and families in this state for many, 19 many years. A terrific lawyer. So I hope you're a 20 chip off the old block. 21 Well, let's talk about these issues. 22 Especially in Mr. Pususta's reply brief this morning 23 regarding his request to intervene in the John Doe 76 24 case, he makes reference to a deposition held in a 25

Roseau County case in which he identifies two priests
-- she identifies two priests -- at her deposition;
one whose name I'm familiar with because I think
there has been some public coverage of his situation.
The other one, a name I'd never heard before.

In addition, Mr. Pususta, in other of his pleadings, claims to have been abused himself as a younger person, I assume by a priest whose name I had not heard before. And I think there's a dispute about whether his name is publicly known.

Mr. Wieser, in some of his papers, says there has been some kind of press conference or something, I think attaches some papers suggesting Mr. Pususta's alleged abuser has already been made public.

So I assume that's what this debate is about as to whether the names of Mr. Pususta's alleged abuser and these names of two clergymen identified by this woman at her recent deposition up in Roseau County or somewhere regarding another case, whether those names should somehow be kept confidential here this morning during our proceeding, for example, and whether there should be other efforts made to protect their identity in the papers that have already been filed and what can be done to

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pull that information back, so to speak, or seal it in some way.

So that's what I'm anticipating. I'm kind of speculating here about what the concerns are. That's really in some way part of this larger issue regarding the so-called list. I know there is a debate about what that list consists of, of 33 "credibly accused" is the term, clergy in the St. Paul and Minneapolis Archdiocese that came out of a study done quite some number of years ago called the John Jay Study. I believe those identities were ordered to be turned over in this very case that we have here before me this morning, the John Doe 76 case, by Judge Johnson.

Judge Johnson required the Archdiocese to turn over the identity of those individuals, or at least some of those individuals, in the course of this litigation, but then subsequently precluded the lawyers from making any of those names public and essentially sealed that information in the court record. The judge saw the list. The lawyers saw the list. But, hopefully, that's the only people who saw the list because, clearly, that was the intent of Judge Johnson. So that's the broader issue. We're going to talk about that in a few minutes.

But, initially, let's just talk a little bit about this concern over I think it's three names that come up in the pleadings before me this morning, two of which apparently there may have been some public dissemination of the identities of these men already, but the third one certainly is a new name to me.

So could we start with Mr. Wieser? I think he's got the primary concern here. I think Mr. Anderson, consistent with his position throughout all of this and in this John Doe 76 case, believes all of this information should become public as a matter of public health concern. Mr. Wieser.

MR. WIESER: Your Honor, you have nicely summarized the general concerns. I can I think more narrowly focus our specific concern. And that is we are seeking that the court seal all references to a priest that I will refer to as J.S. I'm going to provide the court with a little background of this. And I have a document that I'm going to refer to but I would prefer not to make part of the court record.

This began in 2004. There was a report that was made to the Archdiocese in 2004 that this priest, again, J.S., had computer images or -- had computers with inappropriate sexual images on them.

The Archdiocese referred the matter for an outside investigation, and that investigation was conducted by a retired police officer. There is some protocol about that investigation process, and I'll talk about it in just a moment.

But, again, the results of that investigation were that there were no illegal images on the computers maintained by priest J.S. Because the determination was that there were no inappropriate images on that computer, there was nothing for the Archdiocese to report to law enforcement.

Now you have referred to a deposition of an individual who was formerly employed by the Archdiocese. We have a transcript from her. Her name is Jennifer Haselberger.

THE COURT: When you talk about the Archdiocese, you're talking about St. Paul - Minneapolis?

MR. WIESER: That is correct. I think we can easily distinguish here because we have the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis and Winona is a diocese.

THE COURT: Got it. The only reason I interrupted you to mention that is apparently Ms.

Haselberger's deposition was taken in conjunction with a claim in Roseau, and it seems like that's a long way from St. Paul and Minneapolis. And it sounds like J.S. may have been a priest who was serving in St. Paul - Minneapolis.

MR. WIESER: That is correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WIESER: And is sill still serving in this Archdiocese. I think that there's no way to describe Ms. Haselberger other than a disgruntled former employee.

With regard to Ms. Haselberger, again, her title was the chancellor for canonical affairs at the Archdiocese. I think her deposition, at least partial transcript provided by plaintiff, indicates what her job responsibilities were. And they did not entail in any way review or investigation of alleged inappropriate materials on a computer. But she nonetheless conducted her own investigation of the images on the computer.

I mentioned a moment ago there is a protocol for how one should go about doing that.

That protocol is that unless you have a clearance from law enforcement, if you inspect images that are illegal, you yourself can be charged with a criminal

offense.

Ms. Haselberger, being unsophisticated and imprudent, herself viewed the images on the computers, maintained -- that were belonging to J.S. but that were in the possession of the Archdiocese since 2004. She made her own determination that those images were illegal. And as suggested by the Archdiocese, she made a report to the Ramsey County Attorney's office that the images that were on J.S.'s computer were illegal.

That report was made the earlier part of this year. And the St. Paul Police Department picked up those computer discs in March of this year. So St. Paul Police began an investigation. And we know from a document I'll provide the court in just a moment that the St. Paul Police Department had two separate investigations of the images on those computers. They took about three months to do the first investigation and determined that there were no illegal images on that computer. And then they took from June through the latter part of September to do the second investigation. Their conclusion was that there were no illegal images on that computer.

My client received a report late yesterday from St. Paul Police which concludes, quote: "Of the

discs that were provided to SPPD, I was unable to find," quote, "child pornography," end of quote, "on any of them. Discs were reviewed by another investigator with similar results. Without finding such, the case cannot be submitted at this time."

I'm going to provide the court with the report. But, again, because it names the priest, I would prefer not to make this part of the record.

Now, again, we're fully prepared to address the merits of this case. But one of the reasons why ---

THE COURT: By "this case" and "the merits," you mean Mr. Pususta's intervention motion?

MR. WIESER: You bet. As you know from your review of Judge Johnson's order, one of the reasons why he issued the protective order was to protect the reputations of individuals who have been wrongly accused. And that's what we have here with priest J.S. Allegations were made. They were independently investigated by an outside investigator on behalf of the Archdiocese and also by the St. Paul Police Department over a seven-month time period. The result of those investigations were that there was no basis for criminal charges to be filed.

So here we have a situation where there are no charges and we have no conviction. We have mere

allegations which have not been substantiated. This meets the threshold of the concerns expressed by Judge Johnson, and there should be no reference to any allegations with regard to J.S. in this matter.

Again, it's our request that those -- he either be referred to by a pseudonym but certainly not by name, and that the documents filed by the plaintiff be sealed.

We talk also --

THE COURT: Has there been other public disclosure of his identity as part of this report to the Ramsey County Attorney by Ms. Haselberger and the subsequent St. Paul Police Department investigation? Or at this point has this all been maintained private?

MR. WIESER: To date, to my knowledge, again, one of the reasons I asked Mr. Engh to be here is if he's got different information, again, to my knowledge, there is no public information about the allegations other than what was filed by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks very much.

MR. WIESER: I want to talk briefly about a priest whose name -- he was a former priest, and that's Mr. Wehmeyer. I have no objection to

referring to him by name in this matter.

THE COURT: Curtis Wehmeyer.

MR. WIESER: Curtis Wehmeyer, that's correct. Again, what I wanted to mention briefly is that, again, it is inappropriate to make references to Mr. Wehmeyer's situation in connection with the motion for intervention by Mr. Pususta in this case.

Now, as the court indicated in its opening comments, plaintiff's counsel knows who the John Jay charter priests are. And plaintiff's counsel knows that Mr. Wehmeyer is not among the priests who are listed or who reported to John Jay.

With regard to Mr. Wehmeyer, again, they attach the MPR report. And there are situations where there are allegations with regard to Mr. Wehmeyer prior to 2002 about probably some indiscrete behavior on his part, but nothing illegal. Those references, for example, are to his approaching adult males in a book store and his also cruising a park. He was picked up by a St. Paul Police officer, but no charges were filed. The point of that is, again, it may have been imprudent behavior on his part; it was not illegal behavior.

When the Archdiocese became aware of the allegations of sexual abuse in June of 2002, it

immediately reported that to St. Paul Police, and the St. Paul Police acknowledgement of that is in a recent MPR and St. Paul Pioneer Press article.

THE COURT: What you're arguing here in part is now kind of going to some of the Rule 24 requirements for Mr. Pususta's intervention, assuming he can get by the personal jurisdiction issues raised by the insufficiency of the notice and some of the other required four elements under 24.

MR. WIESER: My concern -- again, Ms.

Larimore will discuss the merits of our motion. But the concern is that, again, plaintiff's counsel knows that Mr. Wehmeyer is not among the 33 priests. By introducing information about Mr. Wehmeyer in this matter, it necessarily compels by implication the potential that we get into a discussion about who is and who is not among those 33 priests. I would urge that we avoid any kind of discussion about that in this matter.

The only other point I would make with regard to Mr. Wehmeyer -- and I refer to him as "Mr. Wehmeyer" not "Father Wehmeyer" because after he was charged and after he was convicted, he was removed from priestly ministry. And I have 14 different newspaper articles from June of 2012, when the

charges were first filed, through February of this year when he was sentenced, newspaper articles by both local papers and by almost all of the local television stations, which identify Mr. Wehmeyer by name, discuss the allegations against him, and that all predated by months enactment of the Child Victims Act in Minnesota in May of this year.

So, again, there is no basis for there to be any discussion in court this morning with regard to Mr. Wehmeyer. Again, it does not go in any way to the elements that the plaintiff is required to prove to allow intervention to occur in this matter.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, maybe just to signal a concern I have going forward here a little bit. I've got concerns about wading into the whole John Jay list of priests issue as a result of Mr. Pususta's petition to intervene for a number of reasons. But I'm equally concerned I guess with a focus on illegal behavior only. It seems to me -- and I need to think about this more and study it some more -- but that behavior which may be inappropriate and suggest some kind of a risk to other young people in our community could be posed by something other than past illegal behavior. I'm concerned, as anybody would be,

including Judge Johnson obviously was, and in light of the well-publicized recent false allegations regarding this football coach out in Apple Valley or wherever he was, a very similar kind of situation. He took some photos of his kids in the bathtub or something and somebody reported this as pornography. Next thing you know, this poor guy is out of his job as football coach and his life has been turned upside down.

On the other hand, I think everybody in our community needs to be vigilant about inappropriate behavior that might be something short of illegal but could still raise some red flags and concerns about whether individuals may be inclined to engage in inappropriate behavior with young people.

I mean, that's something I'm certainly willing to hear more about. But I'm a little concerned about just focusing on the fact that the Ramsey County Attorney or St. Paul Police have determined that J.S., for example, did nothing illegal. There may be other facts related to the investigation or what is known about some of these individuals that support the concerns of Mr. Pususta and John Doe 1. I'm not there yet, but I just want you to know what I'm thinking so I don't end up

issuing some kind of order and you say: Where the heck did that come from? So maybe we need to address that a little more. But for now, let me just ask, Mr. Engh is here, and are you here for J.S.?

MR. ENGH: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything you want to disagree with or add to or maybe comment on what I just said?

MR. ENGH: I appreciate your concerns.

I've had him as a client since this spring. He is presumed innocent. And the mere disclosure of his name would ruin that presumption in the public sphere. It would ruin his reputation in the Google era that we have now. And there is no evidence in that report that he did anything illegal.

THE COURT: See the dilemma I'm in a little bit as a judge? We've got this whole balancing business going on here. On the one hand, there's a lot of concerns about clergy abuse and just predators in our community generally, unfortunately; and we've got to be concerned about young people in the community.

On the other hand, we've got reputations built over a lifetime on the other. So it seems to me what judges are doing, as we are often doing with these First Amendment issues regarding

confidentiality, we're doing some kind of a balancing act trying to determine which of these -- both very important public interest considerations in the community -- needs to get more attention.

Would you agree with that?

MR. ENGH: I would agree, everything's a balancing act. But in our system our schemata of law, the presumption of innocence carries a great deal of weight, especially when there is no allegation of a crime being committed.

If he had been charged, had he been jailed, had there been a complaint filed in open court, the balance would inure to the victim, if there is a victim. But until that occurs, he's absolutely innocent of everything. There's nothing to indicate in these reports that he's harmed anybody, which is your concern and society's concern, obviously.

THE COURT: So he's a little different than the football coach I mentioned in that case, at least I believe -- I mean, I think that case was tried.

MR. ENGH: That was dismissed. That was Mankato, and they ruined his life. He'll never be employed again.

THE COURT: But it went further than J.S.'s situation. The police and/or County Attorney

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determined to proceed with a prosecution and then the Judge threw it out. That case went apparently further than J.S.'s situation.

MR. ENGH: That's correct. He's not been charged. He won't be charged. And it's -- the shame of Mankato and the cautionary tale it tells you and everybody else is even if a county attorney decides the charges should be filed, they may not -- they should not have been on occasion. They absolutely ruined that guy, to no reasoned end, really.

THE COURT: It's a tricky balancing act, you know; we want to encourage, you know, really, public citizens to be vigilant about behavior they think is inappropriate and to report it. And we want our public officials to be vigilant about these things. The question is if we're going to have them err on one side or the other, where do we have them err? Do we have them err on the side of vulnerable young people or have them err on the side of protecting reputations of adults?

MR. ENGH: In this case, you do the latter.

There is no question about it. Thanks.

THE COURT: Thanks very much.

MR. WIESER: Could I make one comment?

THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Wieser.

MR. WIESER: I think your comments illustrate the concerns that we have. And I think that that is precisely what the plaintiff is trying to do here. We're not here today to talk about the release of the 33 John Jay priests. We're here today for one purpose, and that is to determine whether or not the plaintiff has met his burden, under the rules, to intervene. Only then do we get into a discussion about whether there should be a release of those names.

So for us to have a discussion about any of the priests at this time, from our perspective, is inappropriate. The focus of the motion is on whether or not the plaintiff has met his four-pronged requirements. That's the reason I bring this to the court's attention at the outset of the conversation, because it would be too easy to fall into the trap of talking about the wrongdoing of the priest, how harmful it is to the community, because we all understand that. We recognize that. We appreciate that. And we agree with that. And that is why this Archdiocese has had policies in place since 1987 that deal with reporting of misconduct of priests.

But that is not what we're here to talk about. That's what we'd like to address and make

sure we're all clear about this morning. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thanks a lot. I appreciate your comments. Let's not get the cart before the horse. Maybe it's a little premature to be talking about some of these issues, but they're important issues. We have all the players here in the room today; good time to maybe sort it out again a little bit.

So, Mr. Anderson, what's your response on this -- really, I guess the original -- really, the main focus is, first of all, on J.S., whether that reference in your reply brief ought to be sealed or stricken somehow; then more broadly, whether Curtis Wehmeyer's identity should have any bearing at all on whether Mr. Pususta ought to be allowed to intervene. We didn't talk too much about J.B.

Maybe just before I hear from you, Mr.

Anderson, what's your position on J.B.? You know who I mean by J.B.?

MR. WIESER: I do. I certainly do, Your Honor. Again, I think that that is the trap we get into by talking about whether or not there should be disclosure. And I haven't addressed J.B. purposely because, again, our position is that we need to determine whether or not Mr. Pususta has a right to

intervene. And only if the court determines that he has met his burden do we then talk about that sort of thing.

THE COURT: You've asked that J.S.'s name be sealed.

MR. WIESER: Right.

THE COURT: But you haven't asked I don't think that J.B.'s name be sealed. J.B.'s name does appear in the pleadings before me today as well. And I think -- and I only had a chance to read these papers once, but I thought your response was: We're not quite as concerned about him because his identity is already well known in the community.

MR. WIESER: Well, it's a difficult spot for me to be in at this point, to suggest that the court is going to have the ability today to seal references to J.B. I think the court does have the ability to seal references to J.S. And, again, it's a toothpaste-out-of-the-tube situation. I guess I would leave it at that at this point. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thanks for your patience.

Mr. Anderson.

MR. ANDERSON: Let me address first the preliminary comments and arguments made by Mr. Wieser and Mr. Engh. Mr. Engh has not made an appearance,

has not filed anything to give him standing to present to the court. And it's not usually my position to stand on technical grounds, but to be presented with the arguments today that he just made, I'm prepared to address, notwithstanding any appearance in this case.

First, the comments made by Mr. Wieser, he said that what I know -- that is, what Jeff Anderson knows -- about this priest and kept on referring to what I know or some of these priests. That is not important, what I know. What this intervention motion is about today is what the public needs to know and has a right to know and must know for the children in our community to be protected. That's why Mr. Pususta is intervening and seeking to -- and demanding or requesting the unsealing of files previously sealed.

Now, for counsel to now present to us some documents that he wants to have sealed and present them to the court that he wants to have sealed not only is in violation of the public's right to know and access, it's in violation of this court's rule: The Minnesota Rules of Public Access to records of the judicial branch bear a presumption of openness. And to present this to you today and to me today is

in violation of that. And so I would first request that whatever was presented to the court and to us be kept open, marked and made a part of the public record. And to do otherwise would not only violate the law, but the spirit of the law and the purposes for which we come before this court to seek the public disclosure of information that we believe poses an imminent public safety hazard.

So I want the court to consider marking those exhibits. I want the court to consider making them part of this public record, and doing so under the public's right to know and the Minnesota Rules of Public Access, I believe it's Rule 3.

As to the arguments made about reference to J.S., I think the court is aware that in our reply memorandum we submitted affidavit and attachments, exhibit -- attachment Exhibit A pertains to recent news accounts and very recent disclosures pertaining to Wehmeyer. And if I heard counsel correctly, there is not objection to references to Wehmeyer, or is there?

THE COURT: Mr. Wieser?

MR. ANDERSON: I need to know, is there objection to reference to Wehmeyer or not?

THE COURT: Did you take a position on

that? I mean, I think I heard you say in terms of referring to Curtis Wehmeyer by name, we've all been doing it so, obviously, it's in the public domain here and in court today.

My understanding with respect to your position on Wehmeyer is: Hey, it's putting the cart before the horse in terms of whether Mr. Pususta's petition to intervene should be granted. It has no relevance to that at this point.

MR. WIESER: Exactly. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Anderson.

MR. ANDERSON: If I'm hearing the position of counsel, are you requesting that attachments Exhibit A and B be sealed? Is that what the request is here?

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Anderson, why don't you make your points to me and then I'll give Mr. Wieser a chance to reply briefly.

So you're unclear about that, and what is your point with respect to it?

MR. ANDERSON: My point is that Exhibits A and B do not meet the test for the sealing, both under Minnesota law and the rules of public access, public documents.

THE COURT: Let me ask you for a second --

I tried to look at a lot of this stuff, but I don't 1 know if I looked at attachments A and B regarding 2 Father J.S. Do those exhibits mention him by name? 3 4 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. THE COURT: Those are like newspaper 5 articles or something? 6 Exhibit A would be MR. ANDERSON: No. 7 recent news accounts pertaining to Wehmeyer -- excuse 8 Exhibit A are recent news accounts by MPR 9 me. pertaining to Wehmeyer and that he had been known to 10 have been or suspected to have been an offender, and 11 reports were made to the Archdiocese years ago. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. ANDERSON: -- or reflected in the 14 15 documents and refers to Jennifer Haselberger as the former chancellor for canonical affairs. That would 16 17 be Exhibit A. THE COURT: What about B? 18 MR. ANDERSON: Exhibit B is a deposition 19 that is a public record taken without a protective 20 order by me in a case pending against the Diocese of 21 Crookston of Jennifer Haselberger. It was taken and 22 given under oath on September 19, 2013. 23 Under oath at that time I asked her about 24 where she had worked and where she had -- why she had 25

left her employ at the Diocese of Crookston and Fargo before that. When I asked her why she left the employ of the Archdiocese of St. Paul - Minneapolis as the chancellor for canonical affairs, it was because she, she says in the deposition, that she had made reports --

THE COURT: Careful about the names now if you talk about names.

MR. ANDERSON: -- on two occasions. And I'm quoting at Page 35, Line 23: I left my position after reporting the Archdiocese, that is the Archdiocese of St. Paul - Minneapolis, to the civil authorities on two occasions; one for child endangerment and one for failing to report child pornography.

And then I go on to ask her to identify those two priests. And it is in that record. One, obviously, we've already identified; the other has been referred to here as J.S.

She goes on to state pertaining to Wehmeyer at the time the Archdiocese learned of misconduct by him, the accusations against Wehmeyer relating to these two boys went to the Ramsey County Attorney's office with evidence that the Archdiocese had known of the issues with Father Curtis Wehmeyer for a

number of years. I am referring to Exhibit B, the deposition given under oath, Page 37, Lines 15 through 22. So this is a deposition, a public record, duly filed in this case, responsive to the arguments made by the Archdiocese in the memorandum that this is an old problem, an old hazard, an old risk many years ago.

In their memorandum they filed last week -we filed our reply attaching these exhibits to
demonstrate the probative value and necessity of this
to show two things: One, this is a public record;
two, this is a recent and imminent and current
ongoing issue.

And Ms. Haselberger's testimony under oath, while described by counsel as a disgruntled employee, had been hired by them as one of their top officials, as a chancellor of canonical affairs who had been qualified as a canon lawyer and employee by them. So to discredit her -- to attempt to discredit her now goes nothing to the probative weight that this needs to be given, nor should it be a basis for sealing a public record duly filed and already on file in this case and testimony given under oath.

In short, the arguments made for the sealing of anything, both presented to this court

today or to the exhibits, both A and B, and most particularly the deposition of Ms. Haselberger, are without merit, are without legal basis, are contrary to the right to public access, and are typical of the very reason that we are here. They continue to attempt to protect offenders at the grave peril of many children in our community. And until we know who the credibly-accused offenders are and where they are, thus the peril exists. To attempt to unseal any part of this record would allow the continuation of the peril and protect nothing other than the reputation of those who may have offended and/or -- at risk for offending and have been determined to have been so.

Now to the argument made by Mr. Engh and I'll refer to -- by you, Your Honor, the coach that was accused and acquitted, indeed, that is an instance that we're now referring to as a coach that was accused and acquitted and the harm done to that coach.

Let's just contextualize that. Let's contextualize that one coach in that one instance that we know was accused and acquitted. Let's contextualize the fact that we have 33 credibly-accused offenders in this list in 2004, and

now we know there are many more that should be on that list since then whose names and identities remain secret. And we think about they having been credibly accused by their employer so they were removed from ministry, and then the Archdiocese has the audacity to say: We removed them all from ministry, so there is no risk. What about Curtis Wehmeyer? They didn't remove him, according to Jennifer Haselberger who testified that they'd known since 2004.

We have to contextualize that one coach against all the other kids who had either been abused or at risk for being abused, and that's in the dozens, if not the hundreds and maybe even the thousands. And so in that context, there is a delicate balance that always needs to be weighed.

Mr. Engh refers to the presumption of innocence, but that applies to criminal cases.

In this case, this is about public safety and the rights of people to know. And, in fact, if J.S. has been determined to have not been in possession of anything that was illegal and the record so reflects that, that Mr. Wieser just presented to the court without filing it, put it in the public record, there it is. There it is. And he

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can stand on that.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks very much for your comments. Mr. Wieser, we've got to stay on schedule here a lot, got a lot to cover. If you could respond specifically to these concerns of Mr. Anderson.

First of all, with respect to the incident report that you have asked me to take note of here this morning, but yet not include as part of the record, Mr. Anderson, while some of his comments got us a little far afield here, one thing he did say resonated with me, and it's kind of you can't have it both ways. If you want me to take some sort of judicial notice of this police report and use it for some purposes in resolving the dispute this morning, then it probably needs to be marked. The fact that it's marked and then becomes a judicial record subject to Rule 2 or whatever it is doesn't get Mr. Anderson all the way home in terms of its public It still requires that I do some disclosure. balancing.

But I am a little concerned that it seems to me you are trying to have it both ways. On the one hand, you want me to be aware of this report in which a police officer determines there's no probable

cause to pursue a claim. On the other hand, you don't want some of the information in it made public. So how do you respond to that, number one.

MR. WIESER: Your Honor, I think that your comments have indicated that you have an appreciation for our concerns. We would certainly be prepared to have that marked and made part of the court record. Certainly your decision with regard to sealing references to J.S. I assume will apply to that document as well.

THE COURT: Very good. Let's have the May 6, 2013, original offense incident report referred to here this morning marked as defendant Archdiocese Minneapolis - St. Paul Exhibit 1.

MR. WIESER: Thank you.

THE COURT: That's the first thing. Let's take a second so Donna can do that.

(Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)

THE COURT: Now we have that, with the cautionary remarks I meant about whether I still I believe have the discretion to seal references to J.S. in that incident report.

Point number two, as to Exhibit B, is that the same deposition of Ms. Haselberger and the Roseau County matter that is referenced in your brief that

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we were talking about earlier? This is the same --There seems to be a little confusion about okay. One of you is nodding yes. Jeff Anderson is that. nodding yes and you're saying no. It seemed to me Mr. Anderson's comments regarding the deposition were focused mostly on Mr. Wehmeyer. And there seems to be some consensus that Mr. Wehmeyer is a pretty well-known public figure. His identity has been disclosed not only in Attachment A, or Exhibit A. to the submissions of Mr. Pususta, but in 25 or 30 pages of news articles that Mr. Wieser has presented to the court. So, to that end, I think the identity issue regarding Mr. Wehmeyer's not important.

Mr. Anderson is arguing, contrary to you, that all of this information about Wehmeyer goes to whether there should be disclosure of this list of 33 credibly-accused priests under the John Jay study.

MR. WIESER: Your Honor, I think I've already made my comments about that. I want to make sure we have time for Ms. Larimore to be able to address the merits of the motion today. So I don't want to take any more of the court's time on that.

If I could make a brief comment about the deposition of Ms. Haselberger?

> THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. WIESER: The date of the depo is September 19th.

THE COURT: This year?

MR. WIESER: That's right. This matter does not relate to the Archdiocese. And I will just tell the court what I have been informed by counsel for the Diocese of Crookston. Mr. Anderson will, obviously, correct anything that's incorrect about that.

My understanding is that this litigation has been in place for at least a year and likely more than a year. My understanding is that Mr. Anderson gave less than one week's notice of his intent to depose Ms. Haselberger. The transcript talks about the role that Ms. Haselberger had at the Diocese of Crookston with regard to investigating allegations of priest misconduct in that diocese and the work she did in that regard. My understanding is that there are numerous documents that relate to her I don't have the entire transcript; investigation. counsel has not provided the entire transcript to the court or to me. But my understanding is that this was an 89- or 90-page transcript, the bulk of which focused on allegations that relate to the Archdiocese that we're here talking about this morning.

THE COURT: Does it include references to 1 J.S.? 2 MR. WIESER: It does. Again, that is on 3 4 Page 36. THE COURT: If exhibit --5 MR. WIESER: By name. 6 Thank you. I apologize for THE COURT: 7 8 interrupting. To the extent Exhibit B were to be 9 considered by the court, made part of the court 10 record here, you would ask that any references to 11 J.S. in the deposition transcript be deleted? 12 MR. WIESER: That is all we're asking. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Got it. Okay. I think 14 15 we've got to get on to the main event here a little 16 bit. Thanks for your remarks with respect to these 17 confidentiality issues. I could tell you my inclination, just so you know kind of where we're 18 headed here. I'm probably going to seal any 19 references to J.S. either in the pleadings or in any 20 attachments to the pleadings. I'm not going to seal 21 any references to Curtis Wehmeyer or John Brown. 22 Those names I think have been in the public. 23 going to reserve, until I've heard some more 24

arguments from Ms. Larimore regarding the merits of

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all of this as to what, if any, relevance Mr.
Wehmeyer's recently-disclosed or investigated
improper activity, what that has to do, if anything,
with respect to Mr. Pususta's petition to intervene.

Let me just give you a couple of comments, Ms. Larimore, that might focus your comments here a little bit. And one of the things I'm going to do before I get to you, I'm going to, first of all, again apologize to Mr. Braun because I did this last time a little bit. I keep overlooking him. He's not an easy guy to overlook; he's a big guy.

First of all, I'll ask you, Mr. Braun, anything you want to say to weigh in on this confidentiality regarding the identity of J.S.?

MR. BRAUN: Your Honor, the Diocese - Winona agrees with the Archdiocese position. He's not a priest of the Diocese of Winona. But we think that the comments that were given by Mr. Wieser support the withholding of his name from the record.

THE COURT: Very good. While I've got your attention -- you can remain seated, Mr. Braun, that's fine. Thank you for standing. You focus a little bit more on the adequacy of the language in the notice regarding intervention than Mr. Wieser and Ms. Larimore. They tee up the issue in a footnote, but

you focus on it and you think it's important. And just because I've had a couple of other cases recently, Mr. Anderson and other counsel, I think it does deserve a little more attention here.

I think anybody who has been in court with me knows that I generally subscribe to the proposition that issues should be resolved on their merits, not on technicalities. But because of some cases I've been involved in recently, the issue of personal jurisdiction is being looked at quite closely by our Minnesota Court of Appeals, especially where it involves construing what appears to be clear legislative language. They're not willing to deal with the substantial-compliance language in a lot of cases anymore.

So what I'm going to ask on this issue regarding the adequacy of the notice and that magic language in the notice is, I'm going to refer you, first of all, to a case that just came out entitled, Koski, K-o-s-k-i, vs. Sharon Johnson. It has to do with technical requirements involving unlawful detainer cases and whether they are an essential prerequisite for the court to get personal jurisdiction in unlawful detainer cases regarding the propriety of the service of the summons or some such

thing. So that's one thing I want you to identify in a supplemental letter brief.

Mr. Anderson, you'll, of course, have a chance to respond to that. I'd like to have that supplemental letter brief from at least you, Mr. Braun, and if St. Paul - Minneapolis wants to join in that or something, that would be great; maybe you could submit some sort of joint supplemental. How about if we get that in about two weeks from today?

MR. BRAUN: That would be fine.

THE COURT: Two weeks from today would be?

THE CLERK: The 17th.

THE COURT: Close of business on the 17th. Andrew will work with you about how you can do that electronically. Then, Mr. Anderson, I'll give you a week after that, or the 24th, to respond. But I want you to see what, if anything, Koski vs. Johnson case has to say with the requirements being strictly construed for the notice. It's a published decision.

MR. ANDERSON: So that I understand what we're talking about here, and as Ms. Lindstrom does too because she'll be doing the work, are we talking about the 24.01 requirement that we put in language in the petition that says that if there is no objection, it is entered by default within 30 days?

THE COURT: Exactly.

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MR. ANDERSON: Okay.

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THE COURT: That's the language.

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MR. ANDERSON: Got that.

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THE COURT: You know, I don't think the

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what I'm concerned about. You know, I think it is --

case should turn on that, but it might, and that's

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you treat it that way in your brief saying: Come on,

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Judge, you're not really going to throw this thing

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out based on this. This is an inadvertent oversight.

But I'm a little concerned about these

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recent cases, including this published case that just

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came out dated September 23 regarding real strict

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compliance with these kinds of requirements. Related

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be an unlawful detainer case called Donald Howard vs.

to that, I issued a decision and it also happens to

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be an unrawrur detainer case carred <u>bonard noward vs.</u>

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<u>Diane Brady</u>, in which I was compelled to conclude that the landlord had misstepped in terms of how it

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effected service of the summons and complaint by

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posting it on Ms. Brady's door. And he, of course,

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was saying: Well, again, this has not been the

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practice in terms of certain things, and the referees

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in both Hennepin County and Ramsey County have allowed us to do it this way for years and years.

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And I said, you know, I'm sorry, I don't think just

because you've been doing it that way makes it right. So I ruled that way on what appeared to be a technicality. But what I really want you again to take a close look at and what is expressly addressed in this Koski case are cases like Time Square Shopping, and Pederson vs. Clarkson.

And this is this whole business about -I'll read real quickly from my decision here in

Howard against Brady:

The court begins with the premise that statutory provisions for service of notice must be strictly followed for a court to acquire jurisdiction.

That's pretty much what the Court of Appeals says in <u>Koski</u>.

Then I go on to say: The court recognizes that when a defendant has actual notice, other courts have sometimes held that substantial compliance with technical service requirements may be sufficient.

I go on to say: Cases should be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities and where the intended recipient receives actual notice, the rules governing such service should be liberally construed. Citing <u>Time Square</u> and this <u>Pederson</u> case.

But then I go on to say, as the Court of Appeals does -- I'm feeling sort of affirmed by the Court of Appeals here in Koski: However, a liberal construction of a statute cannot overcome a statute's unambiguous notice requirements.

So I don't think this issue is totally settled for this case. I'm going to take a fresh look at it, but I think it's important. Mr. Braun, you've highlighted it a little bit more than anybody else, that's why I'm going to give you the laboring oar. Let's get a relatively short letter brief on this. I'll give Mr. Pususta a chance to respond.

But those are two things in particular.

Andrew will give you copies of my decision in the <a href="Howard">Howard</a> against <a href="Brady">Brady</a>. And in <a href="Koski">Koski</a> against <a href="Johnson">Johnson</a>, you can find that I'm sure on the web.

So anything else you want to say about the notice issue before we get to Ms. Larimore here?

MR. BRAUN: I think I'll reserve my comments, after I've had an opportunity to review the <a href="Koski">Koski</a> case and submit those in writing.

Part of the reason we didn't go into the four-pronged test is because the notice of intervention only focuses on the Archdiocesan list of names, not the list of the Diocese of Winona. We

didn't endeavor into that four-prong analysis because it doesn't affect us specifically.

MR. ANDERSON: Can I make one comment on that particular --

THE COURT: The substantial compliance bit?

MR. ANDERSON: Yeah. I think we did omit

that language, but I think it is clear in this record

also that they filed their objections within 30 days.

THE COURT: They clearly had notice. It's really a very --

MR. ANDERSON: So what is the prejudice, number one?

THE COURT: There might have been other people that wanted to object. I don't know who they might be, but it goes to that broader issue of what is the notice that has to be given and how strictly should it be construed?

MR. ANDERSON: I would only say that, without reading that particular case and your ruling, when it comes to the notice to be given to a named party, who is objecting here, if you're throwing them out of an apartment, you've got to make sure, as you've ruled, that they know about it, you know. And it's not fair and it's prejudicial to make sure there's not strict compliance with notice, as you

ruled.

So I would suggest that here anybody that needed to know would have known. And all the parties that did need to know here did object within the 30 days. And if there is a technical violation, it's at most harmless and nonprejudicial. Nothing more to say about that.

THE COURT: Very good. Thanks a lot. That may be where we end up on it. But I'm just concerned about this new case that just came out yesterday, and I really didn't have a chance -- I just saw it in the legal news, that sort of highlighted it for me this morning.

Ms. Larimore.

MS. LARIMORE: I have a question about the supplemental letter brief that you requested. Do you want that to also address the pleading requirement that is also referred to in Rule 24.03, or do you just --

THE COURT: Yes, address the pleading requirement too.

MS. LARIMORE: Okay.

THE COURT: I wasn't real clear what that was about. But <u>Koski</u> and my earlier case don't talk about any kind of pleading requirement. That's sort

of a separate deal. Yes, that would be worth it; as long as we're going to spend a little more time on that, please include that as well. Thank you for that.

Okay, let's talk about the Rule 24 requirements. Here are just the notes I wrote down after reading the briefs on this.

With respect to the requirement, as I understand, all four requirements have to be met.

There is a semicolon and number four, so you've got to have all four: Timeliness, et cetera.

I focused a little bit on the adequacy of the presentation of the issue by other means. And it just seemed to me, especially here where this case is closed, this case has gone all the way up to the Supreme Court. There was a decision out of the Supreme Court, and I believe the claims have been dismissed pursuant to that some time ago. So the case is closed. I know there are these cases that talk about intervention post-judgment and so on. I haven't had a chance to read all of those.

But this seems to be kind of an unusual forum for Mr. Pususta to seek to intervene where the case is closed. But beyond that, it seems to me the same issue has been teed up and litigated vigorously

and argued vigorously on two prior occasions in this docket. And Judge Johnson has ruled adversely to Mr. Pususta's position on at least two occasions in this case already. But beyond that, the same issue has been teed up in John Doe 1 and is pending before me in that case. And I will take a fresh look at it in John Doe 1.

So it does seem to me -- and it's been argued by Mr. Anderson and his law firm and his colleagues in all of these cases. So I think it's a stretch for you, Mr. Pususta -- and I don't mean to talk about you personally, Sir, but you are the named party -- it's a stretch for you to say that this isn't going to be adequately presented. It's the same lawyer who has presented it on all of these prior occasions. I mean, believe me, if anything, we know Mr. Anderson is a vigorous advocate and an internationally well-known lawyer on these issues.

So I think it's a little hard for you to get by that leg of the stool here, which you've got to get by; all four you've got to get by. To say it's not going to be adequately presented by other means I think is a real stretch.

So, you know, Ms. Larimore, you can focus on whatever you want to focus on, but that is the one

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that was kind of a hangup for me. I mean, there are other issues on all of the other four -- other three -- requirements, but I think four was a particularly hard hurdle for Mr. Pususta.

I think that's all I wanted to say. Those are kind of my reactions after reading the briefs.

So Ms. Larimore.

MS. LARIMORE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Counsel -- and, Your Honor, I would like to thank you for helping to kind of narrow some of the issues today. I would like to do that a little bit further, if I may?

THE COURT: You may.

MS. LARIMORE: 76C, Your Honor, the case that Mr. Pususta is seeking to intervene in dealt with a protective order, okay? So that's what he is seeking to have lifted by and through his intervention. And the rules provide the standard, as you noted, for that intervention. I'm happy to address those four requirements.

I can address the fourth one, that his interest was not adequately represented; the interest he claims as being the basis for intervening was not adequately presented. I can discuss that first if you'd like or I can take them in order.

THE COURT: You go ahead however you want. Just try to have your eye on the clock here a little bit. You know, we've just had to deal with lots of tricky and difficult issues this morning. It's already after ten, so I'm thinking that at about 10:30 at the latest we're going to have to take a little break here so the court reporter gets a well -needed break and the rest of us can get a break as well. So if you'd just keep that in mind.

MS. LARIMORE: That sounds great, Your Honor. Thank you.

Let's talk about that fourth prong first, since that's the one you raised. That is the one that says that Mr. Pususta as the intervenor has to show that his interest was not adequately represented in the prior litigation in the case that is now closed.

THE COURT: Would it be fair to say that that requirement would also extend, as I suggested, to the pending John Doe 1 coverage of the same issue? I mean, it's pending.

MS. LARIMORE: Sure, Your Honor. I think that goes to the third prong, which asks whether Mr. Pususta's interest in intervening here is that he needs to intervene so that his interest is not

impaired, okay? I think those other cases you mentioned, John Doe 1, for example, and the nuisance claims that have been brought there suggest that in fact he does not need to intervene here, but that he can pursue his claim for damages and raise these various issues in another more appropriate forum, as opposed to a case that has been closed for over a year and that has proceeded through the appellate courts.

I think that in addition to that, the reliance on the Child Victims Act suggests also that his interest is not impaired, because the Child Victims Act, the amendment to the statute of limitations for sex abuse claims gave him a forum in which to pursue the allegations that he's raising, in that it gave him an opportunity to bring an action for damages, okay?

THE COURT: I think what he's arguing is he thinks he's got a better shot at getting this protective order lifted in this case because the Archdiocese is going to just come out guns blazing against his nuisance claims if he tries to bring a nuisance claim. He's going to get shot down if he sues Father Brown in a separate lawsuit or if he tries to intervene in John Doe 1, he doesn't have as

good a chance as he has here.

MS. LARIMORE: I think that kind of argument is belied by the fact those claims are being made, okay? And if there is no easy or clear way to get the names, maybe that's because the current -- the concerns that are recognized by the protective order that Judge Johnson issued and then upheld back in September of 2011, that those are actually legitimate concerns. And there is -- that Mr. Pususta or whatever plaintiff hasn't demonstrated a right to publicly disseminate or broadcast that information.

THE COURT: This gets kind of to the nub of it I think. It's the Archdiocese's position, as I understand it, really nothing changed; nothing substantially changed since Judge Johnson imposed his protective order. The same good arguments that were made at that time and considered by Judge Johnson and resolved in favor of the Archdiocese is the same that would happen here.

The only fly in that ointment or kink in that argument is the Curtis Wehmeyer stuff. There's new stuff. It's not the same. We can't talk about J.S., but we could talk about Wehmeyer. And is Wehmeyer enough to change the playing field here a

little bit?

MS. LARIMORE: No, Your Honor, not for this intervention, okay? The reason for that is that prong number two requires Mr. Pususta to show he has the same interest as what is going on in this litigation itself, the protective order. That he has an interest in getting the protective order released. Mr. Wehmeyer is beyond that protective order. He wasn't included in the John Jay priest study, and so the names that are being sealed, as Mr. Anderson says, by the protective order in this case would not include Mr. Wehmeyer.

So he's seeking, in fact, for even broader relief than what was at issue in this case, 76C. And so, to that extent, to the extent that he has argued that there are new concerns, that there are, to quote counsel, many more that should be on the list, he is raising something that goes beyond the bounds of 76C, beyond the bounds of the protective order, beyond the bounds of what is at issue in the claims and defenses in 76C. And as a result, he has demonstrated that he cannot meet prong number two, which requires him to have the same interest.

In fact, to talk a little bit about that interest, Your Honor, one of the points in counsel's

reply memo is that Mr. Pususta has an interest in 1 having this information released to other individuals 2 who might bring a claim under the Child Victims Act. 3 There is a case called Philip Morris. It's cited in our memo in response. It says that it is inappropriate to lift a protective order simply to 6 allow a party to share discovery with others in 7 similar litigation. So to the extent he's arguing he 8 needs it to provide to other individuals, that is inappropriate under Philip Morris. 10 THE COURT: That's a Minnesota Supreme 11 Court case, isn't it? 12 MS. LARIMORE: I think it might be a Court 13 of Appeals case. 14 THE COURT: Well, that's not important. 15 I can get you that cite if MS. LARIMORE: 16 you would like. It's State vs. Philip Morris, 606 17 N.W.2d 676, 2000 Court of Appeals case. 18 THE COURT: Still binding on this poor 19 trial judge? 20 Still binding. Still MS. LARIMORE: 21 precedential. Still published. 22 So, Your Honor, with that issue kind of 23 being addressed, I want to just mention the 24 timeliness piece. Your Honor, Mr. Pususta's counsel 25

does not dispute that he has to show that his intervention is timely. He doesn't dispute that usually post-judgment intervention would be disfavored, and he doesn't dispute that the judgment here was final almost a year before intervention, okay?

I want to talk a little bit about the <a href="Brakke">Brakke</a> case, B-r-a-k-k-e. That is a Minnesota Supreme Court case. It's cited in both parties' briefs; 279 N.W.2d 798, a Minnesota Supreme Court from 1979. What <a href="Brakke">Brakke</a> did was recognize the importance of finality, even in cases where a third party is seeking to intervene. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that intervention after trial was generally disfavored. Do you want a copy?

THE COURT: I've got it. I was just looking for Jeff Anderson's reply brief because he talks about Brakke in his reply brief. I don't know if you know what he said there. I was going to throw it up at you to see what you think about his comments on Brakke.

MS. LARIMORE: I think I have an idea of what he says. And I'll try to address that.

What <u>Brakke</u> did was it talked about intervention after trial is generally disfavored. In

that case the court noted that intervention had not been sought there until ten months after a district court order on the issue and nine months after the Supreme Court had denied a writ of prohibition, okay?

The court denied intervention, noting the importance of finality in cases, and that the intervenors could pursue their own action for damages.

Now counsel has attempted to distinguish that case, saying that it was just an attempt to try to perfect an appeal. But I think that the circumstances that are presented here are even more extreme and demonstrate even more why finality in this case should govern. The timeline here is that the judgment in this case was entered in August 2012. Intervention was not sought until almost a full year later, and that was after the Supreme Court decision, after a July 2011 Court of Appeals decision, after a trial court dismissal of 76C's claims, and then well after the April 2009 protective order that is now being called into question by this intervention.

As in <u>Brakke</u>, Mr. Pususta has an opportunity to pursue his own claims elsewhere. And because of that, we think the principles of finality should govern. Actually, <u>Brakke</u> is quite on point in

this case.

I would like to just comment on the Child Victims Act a little further, if I may, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Thank you. That's the one thing I'm still a little unfocused about, whether that changes the game at all in terms of things that are new since the April 2009 protective order in Judge Johnson's determination, and actually the Supreme Court decision in this case. I'm, obviously, interested in something that might be new. That's why I focused a little bit on the Wehmeyer stuff.

But did this three-year window that was opened in this Child Victims legislation from I think just this last session of the Legislature, right?

Does that give Mr. Pususta something to grab onto?

MS. LARIMORE: It might give Mr. Pususta something to grab onto if he were to bring an action for damages in a separate case. But it really has nothing to do with the protective order that was issued here.

That legislative action amended the statute of limitations. It has nothing to do with giving a claimant a right to disclose what would otherwise be private and nonpublic information. It provided an action for pursuing what the statute itself

identifies as an action for damages. If the Legislature had intended more, it could have done so.

The mere fact that the courtroom might now be open to additional individuals who can file claims that used to be time-barred does not support the need for intervention, because lifting the protective order is not necessary for those individuals to file a claim.

A victim of abuse by clergy knows who the perpetrator was. Mr. Pususta, with all due respect, and very respectfully, is evidence of that, as he named his abuser at a press conference. Other individuals don't need to -- other individuals who were abused don't need to know that the priest had a prior history or abused other individuals in order for them to file a claim. That's not part of the requirement for bringing a negligence claim underneath the Child Victims Act.

In fact, the CVA, as I mentioned before, shows that intervention isn't necessary because it provides -- intervention in this case -- is not necessary because it provides an avenue for pursuing a claim for damages and bringing these other issues to light, you know, through whatever process counsel deems most appropriate. And that is where the court

should be hearing those kinds of arguments, not as part of this closed or dismissed case.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you want to highlight? I think we've covered a little bit on each of the prongs. We focused primarily on the fourth and the first. Anything else you want to say? I think you talked a little bit about how two and three come into play based on some of the questions I asked. Anything else you want to highlight?

MS. LARIMORE: I think you're right, that two, three and four are, you know, kind of intertwined when you start thinking about them. The only thing I would like to say with regard to number four is just to address a point that was raised in counsel's reply memo, which is that his interest is not protected because this case was dismissed. Your Honor, I think that's a specious argument because it would render the requirement meaningless in any case where the case is closed, okay? So it would get rid of number four in any case where the parties have dismissed the case or where the court has dismissed the case.

So I don't think that's how Rule 24.01 is meant to work. I think if Mr. Pususta has a unique interest as he says he does, that he should pursue

that in a more appropriate forum.

And unless Your Honor has questions that he would like me to address, I'm happy to finish up.

THE COURT: Mr. Pususta seems to be in a quite similar situation to John Doe 1 in that he claims his need to revisit the whole disclosure of the John Jay Study priest list is unique for him because he is a victim himself. That raises some additional standing to address these issues. But that's the same position that John Doe Number 1 takes.

Okay. Thanks very much. I don't have anything more.

Let's take a few minutes. You can think about what you want to say a little bit, Mr. Anderson. Let's just take 10, 15 minutes, and then we can finish up. Thanks. You're all doing a great job.

(Brief recess.)

THE COURT: Thanks, everybody. Be seated. We're back on the record in John Doe 76C, which is Court File 62-C9-06-003962 in conjunction with David Pususta's petition to intervene in the action.

Ms. Larimore, anything you want to say finally? I think you rested there pretty much.

MS. LARIMORE: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 We'll have the opportunity to just respond very 2 briefly to anything? 3 THE COURT: You will. 4 MS. LARIMORE: Okay. Then I have nothing 5 further at this time. 6 THE COURT: I again made the error of 7 skipping by Mr. Braun. Mr. Braun, anything you want 8 to say to contradict or add to what Ms. Larimore 9 said? 10 MR. BRAUN: I have nothing further, Judge. 11 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Sir. 12 Mr. Anderson. 13 MR. ANDERSON: May I remain seated? 14 THE COURT: You can. You sure can. 15 MR. ANDERSON: I agree; it's a four-prong 16 Let me address each of them very briefly. test. 17 First on timeliness, all the cases cited here were 18 where people knew about what was going on and they 19 kind of sat on their rights waiting for something 20 21 else to happen. Here, we have a record before us where Mr. 22 Pususta, number one, never would have known or had 23 any way of knowing about 76C. And what the trial 24 court did and what the Supreme Court ultimately did 25

in dismissing the case on the statute of limitations, so it's not like any of those cases where people seeking intervention sat on rights. This is clearly distinguishable and, frankly, compelling.

And it was only because of the Child Victims Act passed this year that he became aware that he may have some rights and through that became aware that the Archdiocese of St. Paul - Minneapolis and the Diocese of Winona were maintaining secret lists of credibly-accused offenders, which caused him extraordinary alarm and causes him to be before this court here today. So I think the timeliness question is easily met. Lest there be questions about that, I think Brakke, B-r-a-k-k-e, in its language says: In Brakke the Supreme Court held the intervention was untimely because the homeowner sought intervention in a zoning case only to perfect an appeal, which the court held was untimely and inappropriate.

In <u>Brakke</u>, it was the nature and the substance of the intervention, rather than the passage of time that prevented the intervention. We have a different situation here.

The next issue is a legitimate interest in the present action. This is a really important component to Mr. Pususta very personally, and I think

-- that is, the safety and wellness of the children, which he is no longer, but as a childhood victim, that safety and wellness and the fear of others being hurt the same way he was by Brown as a child is compelling and I think persuasive and overarching here.

I think that interest is made even more heightened and underscored by the exhibit and I think compels support for our position that the Archdiocese put before the court -- I direct the court back to Defendant's Exhibit 1; that is the police report that they put before the court.

At Page 5 of it, the report states that there were thousands of images downloaded from a computer of pornographic images, appear to be prepubescent boys performing oral --

THE COURT: Slow down a little bit, Mr.

Anderson. When you read, everybody speeds up. Slow down a bit.

MR. ANDERSON: I'm so sorry.

At Page 6 of 6, the third paragraph, it says: Appears to be prepubescent boy performing oral sex on another male. At Page --

MR. ENGH: May I? Excuse me, Mr. Anderson, for just a moment. May we intercede an objection to

the reading of a police report which may or may not be an exhibit?

THE COURT: Well, I think it is -- it's an exhibit. I received it, but I've said that we're going to seal any references to J.S.

MR. ENGH: I would request that you seal the entire police report as well, because he's reading allegations which were not found to be -- to have any merit whatsoever, meaning the inference that they have merit here. And it's an unfair inference.

In all due respect, sorry to interrupt, Mr. Anderson, but I do note my objection.

THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, any thoughts? I mean, I can read, so I can take a look at this. But I don't know if giving additional emphasis to some of these now apparently at least by the police department disregarded concerns to fill up the record with emphasis on them, I don't know how appropriate that is.

Mr. Anderson.

MR. ANDERSON: Okay. They call them disregarded concerns. Let's talk about the record and the exhibit they just put before you. Please look at it, please.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ANDERSON: This is really important because they made representations to you. If you look at Page 1 of 4, you see the supplemental offense incident report?

THE COURT: Yes, I see that.

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. At the bottom of it, you will see that in the last paragraph, in the middle of it, it states: The computer content and made reference to several search terms, including naked boys, et cetera. See that part? Okay?

THE COURT: Just one minute.

MR. ENGH: I still reiterate my objection. He's going around my objection. I object.

THE COURT: You know, I'm going to overrule it for now, Mr. Engh, because no individual has been identified with respect to the focus of this investigation or report, except by the initials J.S. I'm going to allow you to try to point me to parts of this you think are particularly relevant, without getting into a lot of detail. But I don't know, what is the point?

MR. ANDERSON: The point is that this report shows that they found he was not charged because the evidence that is documented in this report was destroyed and not turned over to the

police.

If you look at Page 2 of the report, Your Honor, the next page, first paragraph, it states, the last sentence: In doing so, the expert -- that they hired to look at this -- found, quote, "thousands of images" --

THE COURT: I see that. Go ahead.

MR. ANDERSON: -- "of young boys performing oral sex."

THE COURT: I see that, yes.

MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Then it goes on to say at the fifth paragraph, that box, there's a three-ring binder, at the last paragraph it states in the middle of it, towards the end: Blank said that on 1/27/13 Father Kevin McDonough, Vicar General at the time, said he believed the images were pornographic images of children and ordered that all evidence be secured in the vault.

And then if you see above that, at the second paragraph, the same page, it says: RCAO Tom Ring told me he believes then-Archbishop Harry Flynn investigated the matter in 2003 and didn't believe there was anything further to do.

And then if you turn to the next page, 3 of 4, the last sentence in it says: It should be noted

I do not have the computer, as we were told that it was destroyed many years ago.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ANDERSON: Okay. So what we have -they're saying he wasn't charged because the evidence
was destroyed. That's what this shows. That's why
we're here is that kind of stuff.

THE COURT: All right. I have it. It's been marked. I just want to note, in looking at this a little more carefully now, at the direction of Mr. Anderson, I notice that this has been sanitized already -- or I don't think sanitized -- there are a lot of deletions in here. I assume those have been done by counsel for -- no. There's a lot of identifying information out of here. How did that happen?

MR. WIESER: Your Honor, this is how my client got the report from St. Paul Police yesterday. We made no redactions to this.

THE COURT: One of the big concerns, I know Mr. Engh's primary reason for being here -- I think it's appropriate for him to be here. It's a little unusual, but I think he probably got pretty late notice of the concerns for his client. And Mr. Engh has been before me before on equally sensitive kinds

of cases and he always is a very responsible guy. Ι 1 appreciate his help. 2 Are there any references to J.S. in this as 3 redacted? You know. I want to be careful if I'm 4 going to do that; if I'm going to seal it to that 5 extent, I want to know where it is. 6 MR. WIESER: Certainly there are, Your 7 If you look on the third page, it says 8 "suspect." There we go. THE COURT: Okav. 10 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, all --11 THE COURT: Wait a second. Go ahead. 12 Anything else? 13 MR. WIESER: Again, I haven't clearly 14 reviewed the document because I just got it late last 15 night, but my recollection is that there are other 16 references by name to that individual in the report. 17 THE COURT: Good. Thanks for highlighting 18 I'll look at it really carefully. I do see 19 that particular one you just mentioned. 20 That's what I was going to 21 MR. ANDERSON: ask you to do. Please, please look at this 22 carefully. I think it bears on the very reasons 23 we're here and why this intervention is appropriate. 24 Thank you very much for doing that. 25

THE COURT: You're welcome. Anything else?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, a couple of other

thoughts, the thoughts on the concerns that you

raised about Pususta's interests not being already

represented by 76C. I think you made the comment

that nothing has really changed since Judge Johnson

ordered --

THE COURT: I said that seems to be the nub of the issue.

MR. ANDERSON: I really want to get this one crystallized for you. Judge Johnson sealed it pending a trial. The trial was coming up in a month, okay? And he said: Listen, let's wait until trial. We're going to consider the probative value of this and all the other things at trial. And we're right before trial. And so it was then, some time after that that he dismissed the case. The appeal was taken, and it went to the Supreme Court ultimately.

And the case -- and this is why it changed -- was dismissed, so we never got the chance to make the argument to him: Now is the time; here we are. Let's do it. It's imperative. Public interest. Public service. Public access. And all those arguments that are being made today couldn't be made back then because of statute of limitations and the

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ultimate dismissal by the Supreme Court. So that was a game changer right there.

The second thing, of course, is the Child Victims Act. Mr. Pususta doesn't necessarily have standing under the Child Victims Act, which was passed this year, unless he can prove and establish and plead negligence.

So the release of names may help him know whether or not this particular offender that offended him could help in that. But his goal in seeking this, given the change in the circumstances and the law, is to serve the public interest and safety of other survivors and children like him who won't be harmed if this information is released.

In short, it has changed. No arguments presented by the Archdiocese, particularly in light of recent information, and given the history before us on 76C compels anything other than to make a full and fair disclosure of those who have been credibly accused. And in that case, all of us can rest a little easier. The prejudice to those who are on those lists is minimal, to the extent they've already been determined to have been credibly accused, so a bar has been met; no longer carries weight. Thus, we ask you to grant the relief that Mr. Pususta has so

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courageously and candidly sought before you.

THE COURT: Very good. Thanks very much.

Maybe, Ms. Larimore, we could come back to one of the last points made by Mr. Anderson. one I was going to ask you about and I forgot. The circumstances under which Judge Johnson issued his protective order, the language that I think is contained in these briefs, which is from the order, says -- at least part of the reason Judge Johnson issued his protective order was: Hey, we're about to have a trial here in a relatively short period of This whole issue can get ferreted out and further addressed at trial maybe in the form of motions in limine or whatever he had in mind. Anderson points out there was no trial. went up on other issues regarding suppressed memory and so on, and then the case was ultimately thrown out.

So when we focus on whether this matter has been fully litigated in the past and nothing has changed, I hear Mr. Pususta saying two things:

First, it wasn't fully litigated; it was, you know -- not to put a pejorative spin on it -- it was punted a little bit by Judge Johnson for good reason: We're going to have another opportunity to look at it

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during trial. Then that opportunity never came along. So it wasn't fully litigated.

Number two, there have been changes. That comes back to this issue we've been kicking around here a lot this morning, that there appear to be some developments involving publicly-known information about at least one former priest, Mr. Wehmeyer I think his name is. I don't know if Mr. Brown is on But at Page 11 of your brief, and I think this list. you raised this list of bullet points a couple of times here and in the John Doe 1 case to suggest that the -- and I know Mr. Wieser and your client object a little bit to the use of the term "list." There is a group of identified individuals, however, which, at the direction of Judge Johnson, has been turned over to the lawyers and to him. So apparently we do have -- there was no list maybe under John Jay because the Bishop just gave the numbers, but Judge Johnson ordered that the identity be disclosed. So there is kind of a list.

But you say that's not really a very reliable thing, and given the downside of exposing the names of these men, based on the canonical definition of "credibly accused," which is it seems to be true, given the downside and given the holes in

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this list, Judge, you shouldn't even go there.

Certainly you don't have to go there in this case in 76C because there are plenty of other issues that make Mr. Pususta's petition to intervene inappropriate.

I'm really thinking ahead a little bit to

John Doe 1. I know we've briefed that and it's

before me, but I'm getting a little concerned -- and

Mr. Anderson has gotten a little bit of a second bite

at the apple here by raising it in this forum today.

But the fact is, I'm aware of this stuff now. But on Page 11 of your brief here and in the John Doe 1 case, none of the identified priests have served in any ministerial assignment since at least 2002. I'm not sure if that's accurate or not, given what we're hearing about Wehmeyer, J.S. and Brown.

Number two, many of the identified priests have been the subject of substantial and widespread media coverage for more than two decades. I'm not sure how many that would be or who they are.

Number three, many of the identified priests are dead. I don't know what "many" means.

And finally, you say, and most significantly, some of the priests who are protected by the protective order were the subject of false

allegations. Again, this is sort of a generic kind of information. I'm just thinking, and I guess I'd like your thoughts on this as long as we're here, as to whether or not that information shouldn't be -- if it's not known to Mr. Anderson, maybe he knows this already, but I don't know it -- first of all, the claim that none of the priests have served, is that still accurate? Number two, what does "many" mean with respect to "being public for many decades?"

Number three, what does "many being dead mean?" And, number four, how many and who have been the subject of false allegations?

I think that would give me a better context. If we're going to say after this vetting is done, we really end up with six men, that's one thing. But if after this vetting is done, we end up with 26, that's I think a little different in terms of what does this list consist of?

Do you understand what I'm saying? This seems to be a pretty generic effort to undermine the importance of the list. And what are the details?

MR. WIESER: I'm not sure I understand your last comment, but let me address the bullet items here first.

As you said, and as counsel will not be

able to refute, he does know who the 33 priests are. We have on more than one occasion listed each one of those items. We have challenged, we have invited Mr. Anderson to rebut any of those items. He has not done so, and he cannot do so because those items were correct when first presented to Judge Johnson in 2009, and they're still correct.

So with regard to the 33 priests who are still living, not one of them has had a ministerial assignment since 2002. The other issues -- let me make a comment. Again, I think that the problem that we have with getting into this is precisely the objection I raised at the outset, which is that we're putting the cart before the horse. But because you've got the Doe 1 case before you, apparently you want more information about this.

Let me say two things about Judge Johnson's hearing in 2009. You can tell from the intensity of Mr. Anderson's arguments today this is a passionate issue for him. And I can assure you that he was no less passionate when he argued the matter before Judge Johnson in 2009. I have a visual image of Mr. Anderson standing up red-faced and pointing at me and making accusations at me about the arguments that I was raising. So there was a full and lengthy

discussion at that time about the issues.

Secondly, the concern that Judge Johnson had that we articulated is that you have to go through each one of these situations on a case-by-case basis to determine what the factual background is, because there are instances where there have been priests who are on the list who have been sued; there have been widespread media attention of those individuals. They've been sued more than once. There have been jury trials. There have been settlements. Those priests, you know -- that's one category, but we have other people --

THE COURT: You and certainly Mr.

Anderson's office, you would know who those people are. I wouldn't necessarily know. I haven't followed this issue that closely. Some seem to get more notoriety here in the Twin Cities newspapers, but there could be coverage of some of these cases outstate.

In any event, this is all pretty public who some of these people on the list -- and Mr. Anderson would know who those are on the list -- the Johnson list maybe we should call it as opposed to the John Jay list -- you would know who is on the Johnson list and could compare what has been made public with

those names.

MR. WIESER: Certainly. Yeah. And I think that, again, J.S. this morning illustrates the concern about another grouping of individuals on that list.

Again, I want to make sure that we're not going to go anywhere into discussing any even allegorical references to people who are on the list, because it is sealed as of this point in time. So when I talk about these matters generically, I want to make sure that we're not getting into that territory.

With regard to again another grouping, J.S. is an example that there was an allegation that was made. An investigation was conducted. It's presumptuous, obviously, for me to say that in 2012 or 2013 that J.S. may have been reported to John Jay if the same question there was submitted at this point in time. But one could certainly understand how that could have been done. That's an example of that troublesome group of people against whom allegations were made, and that's all that happened.

Mr. Engh talked about the rights those individuals have under criminal law. There is a whole separate set of rights those individuals have

under canon law. And the Archdiocese and, by implication, Ms. Haselberger have to respect those rights. And they cannot simply, on their own, remove ministerial functions. They have to go through a process under canon law to do that.

And, again, what we're trying to do here is to forestall a situation where individuals who have been merely accused, and that is it, under canon law or civil law, somehow get besmirched in this process.

As Judge Johnson stated in his order -this is Page 3 of his protective order from April of
2009: To publicize the allegations would potentially
violate the privacy of victims as well as destroy the
reputations of individuals who may be innocent of any
wrongdoing.

THE COURT: You have responded to my concern or inquiry as it relates to this case and as to John Doe 1, which is also pending before me. I just want to be clear. At this point I'm not asking for any additional briefing. But I'm just about to get into that case a little bit, and I had it on my mind a little bit. If I feel I do need some supplemental briefing or have you come back in and talk about it, I'll let you know, but I'm not doing it today, all right?

Then, Ms. Larimore, I don't know if you got your chance to respond. If you had anything else to say by way of reply to Mr. Anderson's arguments, anything else you wanted to add?

MS. LARIMORE: Just very briefly, maybe two points. The first is that although the interest that has been identified is one relating to safety or wellness or health of individuals, counsel has not identified any specific case which would give a right to intervene in that situation.

What really is at issue here is whether or not these are public records or whether these are nonpublic records. And the fact that these have been filed with the court pursuant to a discovery order and under seal do not transform those documents into public documents.

THE COURT: This is the business a little bit about the difference between documents provided during discovery, as opposed to documents provided in conjunction with a dispositive motion or at trial, right? There is a distinction in the law about those.

MS. LARIMORE: You're right, Your Honor.

There is a distinction in the law about those. And that's because there is, as counsel pointed out, a

general presumption to open access to judicial records. But that presumption does not extend to documents that were provided simply during the course of discovery or generated during discovery.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Anderson argues the entire record was considered by Judge Johnson and maybe the appellate courts as this case went up?

MS. LARIMORE: You know, Your Honor, we have identified in our brief why that argument is disingenuous; the first being that at issue before the court in those orders on summary judgment was statute of limitations, as Mr. Anderson pointed out. Nothing relating to those lists. So the mere fact that someone relies on an entire record does not magically transform everything into an open, public document, particularly when those documents are all filed under seal pursuant to a protective order, okay?

And then to lift the protective order, Mr. Anderson has to identify a compelling basis. We have provided the court with case law to the extent -- to that extent -- and that has not been refuted. What those cases say is not a compelling emotional basis, not a compelling, passionate plea to have the protective order lifted, but a compelling, factual or

legal basis for lifting the protective order. And that is the interest he has to satisfy in order to lift the protective order and, as a result, an order to intervene here. He has not done that, Your Honor.

And for that reason, we don't think that he's met any of the prongs of the test for intervention. And he's not shown these are public records, and he's not shown there is a compelling basis. This case calls upon the court to divorce itself from the emotion and fear and hyperbole and to apply those standards.

We would ask that the intervention be dismissed.

THE COURT: Very good. I know Mr. Anderson is --

MR. ANDERSON: Two sentences, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Will you promise me? Okay, two sentences. All right. That's it, because then I've got to give these folks two sentences.

MR. ANDERSON: This isn't about emotion.

Philip Morris is just like this. This is about child safety, and that Philip Morris, they released the information because there was a risk of cancer and addiction in tobacco. It's like that. They released it there. Not all discovery material goes out. End

-- but this should.

THE COURT: You want to say anything about whether it's a fair parallel between nicotine and abusing pedophiles?

MS. LARIMORE: No, Your Honor. I think you can read the case.

THE COURT: Very good. I will. I appreciate it. Again, like I said, you all did a great job today.

You know, I think I've got enough here; I'm not going to ask you for proposed orders in this case. I think I've got enough paper here already to deal with in terms of getting an order out. I'll try to do that in fairly quick order.

The only issue that kind of has been opened here is this matter that I asked Mr. Braun to take the lead on a little bit regarding this substantial compliance and technical deficiencies in the notice and the pleading with respect to this notice of intervention under some recent case law, one decision from the Court of Appeals and one from me. We've given you some deadlines for that brief. And certainly Mr. Anderson will have a chance to respond.

I finally wanted to say to Mr. -- I want to get your name right -- Mr. Pususta, again, I think

that you provide a public service by coming forward with your own personal situation which probably is hard for you to talk about under any circumstances, and then to take up the torch for maybe other folks you're concerned about, I think that's a real good public citizenry, and you're to be congratulated for that. And to come here into open court with a lot of people you don't know wearing suits, looking at you and sizing you up, that takes some guts. So good for you. Okay.

Thanks everybody.

(Whereupon, court adjourned at 11:19 a.m.).

STATE OF MINNESOTA 1 COUNTY OF RAMSEY 2 3 4 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 5 I, Donna Luzaich, do certify that I am an official 6 Court Reporter in and for the County of Ramsey, Second 7 Judicial District, State of Minnesota, and that I reported 8 the foregoing proceedings in this matter, and that the 9 transcript contained on the foregoing 80 pages is a true 10 and correct transcript of the shorthand notes taken by me 11 at said time and place herein mentioned. 12 13 DATED: 10/3/13 14 15 /S/ \_\_\_\_ 16 DONNA LUZAICH 17 Official Court Reporter 1470 Ramsey County Courthouse 18 St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 Telephone: (651)266-8345 19 20 21 22 23 24 25